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Abstract
The principle of rationality has been invoked to explain that infants expect agents to perform 
the most efficient means action to attain a goal. It has also been demonstrated that infants take 
into account the efficiency of observed actions to achieve a goal outcome when deciding 
whether to re-enact a specific behavior or not. Puzzlingly, however, they also tend to imitate 
an apparently suboptimal unfamiliar action even when they can bring about the same outcome 
more efficiently by applying a more rational action alternative available to them. We propose 
that this apparently paradoxical behavior is explained by infants' interpretation of action 
demonstrations as communicative manifestations of novel and culturally relevant means 
actions to be acquired, and present empirical evidence supporting this proposal. In 
Experiment 1, we found that 14-month-old infants re-enacted novel arbitrary means actions 
only following a communicative demonstration. Experiment 2 showed that infants inclination 
to reproduce communicatively manifested novel actions is restricted to behaviors they can 
construe as goal-directed instrumental acts. The study also provides evidence that their re-
enactment of the demonstrated novel actions reflects epistemic rather than purely social 
motives. We argue that ostensive communication enables infants to represent the teleological 
structure of novel actions even when the causal relations between means and end are 
cognitively opaque and apparently violate the efficiency expectation derived from the 
principle of rationality. This new account of imitative learning of novel means shows how the 
teleological stance and natural pedagogy – two separate cognitive adaptations to interpret 
instrumental vs. communicative actions – are integrated as a system for learning socially 
constituted instrumental knowledge in humans.
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Beyond rational imitation: Learning arbitrary means actions from communicative 
demonstrations
The principle of rationality as a fundamental factor governing action selection in 
knowledge-based systems was introduced by Newell (1982): ‘If an agent has knowledge that 
one of its actions will lead to one of its goals, then the agent will select that action.’ The 
rationality principle has also been proposed to be the central inferential principle in Gergely 
and Csibra’s (2003) theory of human infants’ teleological action interpretation mechanism. 
This core system is a cognitive adaptation to represent instrumental actions in terms of their 
teleo-functional properties. It implements human infants’ naive theory of rational action in the 
domain of instrumental agency by representing actions as efficient means to bring about 
specific goal states in the world. The main tenets of the rationality principle are that (1) 
actions serve to bring about future goal states, and (2) goal states are realized by the most 
efficient action available to the actor within the constraints of the situation (Gergely & Csibra, 
2003). Teleological reasoning (just like mentalistic or practical reasoning about actions) 
relates three aspects of action interpretation – goals, actions, and situational constraints – in a 
systematic manner by the ‘rationality assumption’: given information about any two of the 
three elements, one can infer (and predict) what the third element ought to be (Csibra, Bíró, 
Koós, & Gergely, 2003). 
Using violation of expectation and eye-tracking paradigms, ample evidence confirms 
that infants can make inferences about observed actions with the help of teleological 
reasoning (Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995; also Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koós, & 
Brockbank, 1999; Csibra et al., 2003;Woodward & Sommerville, 2000; Sodian, Schoeppner, 
& Metz, 2004; Wagner & Carey, 2005; Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005; 
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Biro, Csibra, & Gergely, 2007; Csibra, 2008; Southgate & Csibra, 2009; Gredebäck & 
Melinder, 2010, 2011; Biro, Verschoor, & Coenen, 2011; Verschoor & Biro, 2012; Hernik & 
Southgate, in press). 
If infants expect other agents to act rationally by choosing to perform the most 
efficient means available to the goal, one would expect infants themselves to rely on the same 
principle of rationality to guide their own choices of instrumental actions as well. This 
prediction, however, was apparently contradicted by the results of Meltzoff’s seminal 
imitation study (1988), in which infants chose to re-enact a model’s unusual and sub-efficient 
head action to illuminate a light-box, instead of just using their hands to induce the same 
effect. Optimizing to 'least effort', operating the light-box by touching it with one’s hand 
seems more efficient (hence more rational) than bending forward from waste to use one’s 
forehead to achieve the same end. To address this puzzle, Gergely, Bekkering & Király, 
(2002) developed a modified version of Meltzoff’s imitation paradigm to test whether 
efficiency evaluations could modify the infants’ action choice and production by introducing a 
new context condition in which the demonstrator’s hands were occupied when she performed 
the unfamiliar head action to operate the touch-lamp (‘hands occupied’ condition). While in 
the original ‘hands free’ condition 69 % of infants re-enacted the head action (replicating 
Meltzoff ’s results), the number of imitators dropped significantly to only 21 % in the 'hands 
occupied' condition. Gergely et al. (2002) referred to this phenomenon of context-sensitive 
learning of novel means actions as ‘rational imitation’. Since the original demonstration, the 
finding of selective ‘rational imitation’ was replicated several times and was shown to 
generalize across a range of different task contexts with 12- as well as 14-month-olds 
(Schwier, van Maanen, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2006; Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2008; Király, 2009a; Zmyj, Daum,& Aschersleben, 2009).
BEYOND RATIONAL IMITATION     4
The explanation of context-sensitive and selective re-enactment of novel actions in 
terms of 'rational imitation', however, has been challenged on several grounds. One alternative 
account developed by Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers & Bekkering (2011a, 2011b) suggests that the 
phenomenon is attributable to the interaction between automatic motor resonance elicited by 
the observed actions and the limited motor capabilities of infants. Another contrasting view 
was proposed by Beisert, Zmyj, Liepelt, Jung, Prinz, & Daum (2012) who consider the 
selectivity of infants' action imitations to differences in attentional factors that are assumed to 
be induced by the different levels of saliency of the head action when observed in the 'hands 
free' vs. 'hands occupied' contexts. Finally, our current account also argues (on different 
grounds) that the original explanation of selective head touch imitation purely in terms of the 
application of the rationality principle fails to capture all the relevant aspects of the 
phenomenon. Below we shall advance and empirically test a new proposal that combines 
teleological action understanding (Gergely & Csibra, 2003) with the theory of natural 
pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gergely & Jacob, 2012) in order to provide a more 
satisfactory explanatory account of the nature of selective imitation and learning of 
communicatively demonstrated novel means actions (for an earlier formulation of this 
hypothesis, see Gergely & Csibra, 2005, 2006). Since the original demonstration of selective 
‘rational imitation’ and the different alternative accounts proposed have all concentrated on 
the head-touch paradigm, we decided to use the very same task to test our new proposal as 
well in order to make a systematic comparison of the various theoretical accounts possible. 
The original ‘rational imitation’ explanation as presented by Gergely et al. (2002) (see 
also Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello, 2008) focused on infants differential 
performance in the new 'hands occupied' condition, and attributed the decreased likelihood of 
re-enacting the unfamiliar head action to infants' evaluation of the rationality of the 
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demonstrated act to bring about the goal given the context of the demonstrator’s situational 
constraints. But why did the majority of infants re-enact the novel head action in the ‘hands 
free’ condition? Here both the model’s and the infant’s own hands were free, so the infants 
could have (rationally) opted for emulating the goal by performing the more efficient ‘hand 
action’ available to them to contact the light-box rather than re-enacting the awkward and 
clearly sub-optimal non-rational head action1. And, as a matter of fact, they did so: all infants 
in the Gergely et al. (2002) study (see also Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers & Bekkering, 2011a) 
performed at least one (and typically more) hand actions to bring about the goal and they 
typically chose to perform the hand action as their first response to operate the light-box. All 
the more strikingly and in spite of that, 69% of the infants in the ‘hands free’ condition went 
on to re-enact the novel ‘head action’ of the model.
The ‘rational imitation’ proposal (Gergely  et al., 2002; see also Buttelmann, et  al, 2008) 
suggests that the reproduction of this apparently non-rational action reflected infants' 
assessment of the novel act as manifesting some unknown reason that must justify the action 
as rational and so they reproduced the odd head-action as a way of figuring (learning) what 
the agent’s (rational) reason for his action might  have been. The main problem with this 
proposal as it stands is that  it essentially  makes the idea of appealing to the rationality 
principle un-falsifiable: When infants did not reproduce the demonstrated action (in the 'hands 
occupied' condition), it was treated as evidence of the application of the rationality principle, 
and when they did reproduce it (in the 'hands free' condition), it was also interpreted as 
evidence for the operation of the same inferential principle (cf. Gergely and Jacob, 2012).
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1 Note that in the study of Meltzoff (1988) in the no modeling baseline condition there was no 
infant who used the head to light up the lamp. This result confirms that the head action is a 
rather unusual mean to perform on the lamp, (see also Zmyj et al., 2009 for similar results 
with a novel lamp setup). 
Our new approach to the selective imitation phenomenon attempts to explain not only 
why infants refrained from imitating the novel action when it seemed rational, but also why 
they reproduced it when it was obviously not efficient. Our account relies on the theory of 
natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2006, 2009, 2011). Gergely and Csibra (2005, 2006) 
argued that children’s tendency to reproduce novel actions of others reflects the functioning of 
an adaptive learning system, which allows for the fast transfer of relevant knowledge between 
individuals. In this view, imitation of behavior does not itself serve a causal role per se in 
learning, nevertheless, the re-enactment of the novel action does provide evidence that 
learning has taken place and about what infants have learnt. According to natural pedagogy 
theory, ostensive communicative signals, such as eye contact and child-directed speech 
(Csibra, 2010), indicate to the child that the information about to be communicated provides 
her the opportunity to acquire some new and relevant knowledge. From this perspective, the 
results of Gergely et al.’s (2002) modified head-touch study can be re-interpreted as follows. 
When ostensive signals are presented to the infant and the model produces her subsequent 
actions deliberately, children interpret the demonstrated action as manifestation of a 
communicative intention of the model rather than as a merely instrumental action. The 
ostensively induced expectation that informative new and relevant knowledge is about to be 
manifested would suggest that the subsequently demonstrated action is important to acquire 
regardless of the fact that it seems not to be the most efficient way to achieve its apparent 
goal, i.e., regardless of the opacity of the model’s choice of the demonstrated action to bring 
about the effect. This account is also supported by further empirical evidence indicating that 
infants (Nielsen, 2006; Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007) and even adults 
(Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 2010) show more imitation in the presence of ostensive-
communicative signals, such as eye-contact.
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When proposing that action imitation in communicative contexts often reflects 
learning, we do not intend to suggest that this epistemic function is limited to learning about 
the physical world only. In fact, when children learn about the function and manner of use of 
novel artifacts, they learn not only about the causal dispositional properties of the physical 
object world, but also about relevant and shared normative dispositional properties of the 
social world around them. (An obvious characteristic of many (though by no means all) 
cultures is the use of cutlery for eating, which is the socially accepted and sanctioned 
normative manner of consuming food even though eating with hands is clearly much easier 
and is universally preferred by children. Moreover, different cultures developed a variety of 
culture-specific artifacts specialized for eating as well as opaque but normative manners of 
using them to satisfy the need to consume food.) In fact, artifacts are cultural products serving 
a variety of functions whose demonstrated use may manifest shared social knowledge not 
only of hidden dispositional affordance properties of the artifact (and its kind) but also about 
social norms and conventional functions that their use may involve or serve (Tomasello, 1999; 
Rakoczy,Warneken & Tomasello, 2008). Note that the ostensively induced ‘basic epistemic 
trust’ (Gergely, Egyed, & Király, 2007) and the social motivation to acquire shared cultural 
knowledge (including social conventions, manners of use, or traditions) from communicative 
action manifestations result in infants’ spontaneous propensity to acquire cognitively opaque 
forms of actions demonstrated to them. The epistemic motivation to learn about opaque but 
socially shared cultural norms and conventions can easily lead to ‘overimitation’ (the general 
tendency evidenced by older children to faithfully re-enact relevant as well as apparently 
irrelevant steps of demonstrated action sequences, see Lyons, Young and Keil, 2007; and 
Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011). For example, a recent study of Kenward (2012) 
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shows that preschoolers imitate actions that they already discovered to be unnecessary to 
achieve an outcome, because they conceive them as norms. 
But how do children know which elements of a demonstrated action sequence 
constitute instrumental and/or social norms to be acquired? We propose that communicative 
demonstrations elicit the presumption of relevance in their addressee (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 
1986). When the model deliberately produces her instrumental actions while engaging in 
ostensive communication with the infant, despite the fact that her action is causally opaque 
(i.e., seemingly not the most efficient way to achieve the goal-state), her demonstration 
activates the presumption of relevance in the infant learner. This presumption guides the 
interpretation of the demonstration by searching for a communicative content that appears in 
some way relevant to the recipient. If the action involves a novel artifact, the most relevant 
information for a novice learner is (1) its function and (2) its mode of usage as dictated by 
instrumental or social norms. It is important to note that because of the opaque nature of much 
cultural knowledge in human societies (Gergely & Csibra, 2006), the naïve learner cannot 
expect to derive (2) from (1) by applying the rationality principle, but the principle can still be 
employed to disregard action elements of the observed demonstration that are justifiable by 
situation-specific physical constraints.
Thus, we propose the following reinterpretation of the selective imitation phenomenon 
demonstrated by Gergely et al. (2002). Because of the ostensive signals that accompany the 
action demonstration, infants construe it as a communicative rather than a purely instrumental 
action (Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra, 2009; Gergely & Jacob, 2012). The fact that the 
action is performed on a novel artifact and produces a salient effect will suggest to them that 
the relevant information to be acquired is the function and usage of the artifact. In the 'hands 
occupied' condition, they learn a final goal state (artifact function: lamp is illuminated) and a 
BEYOND RATIONAL IMITATION     9
sub-goal (usage: the lamp is operated by contact) that brings about the final goal. The relation 
between these two goals is arbitrary as infants have no way to assess the causal mechanisms 
by which the sub-goal produces the final goal. Infants then learn this arbitrary relation as the 
informative content communicated by the action manifestation. In the ‘hands occupied’ 
context there is nothing more to explain about (or learn from) the demonstration because the 
model (in accordance with the rationality principle) performs the most efficient action 
available to her to produce the sub-goal (to achieve ‘the lamp being contacted’). Therefore, 
the infants who observed the head-touch in the 'hands occupied' condition and acquired the 
sub-goal to achieve ‘direct contact with the lamp’ will touch the lamp with their hands as this 
is the most efficient action available to them to bring about the sub-goal. In the 'hands free' 
condition, however, the rationality principle would be violated by the demonstrated head-
touch action if its goal state would be assumed to be the same sub-goal (i.e., to 'make contact 
with the lamp’) performed in order to light up the lamp (the final goal). This would leave the 
agent’s choice of performing the sub-optimal head touch action as the means action 
unaccounted for. Thus, the observed action is re-analyzed at a finer level by the introduction 
of an additional finer-grained arbitrary means-end relation: namely, the normative further sub-
goal specifying that the sub-goal of ‘contacting the lamp’ ought to be achieved by the use of 
the head. This second arbitrary relation is then added to the inferred informative content of the 
communicative demonstration, i.e., to the manifested relevant new knowledge to be acquired. 
Therefore, when infants have an opportunity to operate the artifact in the ‘hands free’ context 
condition, they retrieve not one, but two sub-goals that they acquired, and reproduce both of 
them by emulation (through the use of the most appropriate motor actions available to them). 
Thus, in so far as both arbitrary means-end relations are stored in and re-activated from their 
memory, they will both use their hands to efficiently realize the first sub-goal (‘making 
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contact with the lamp’), but will also re-enact the head action to efficiently bring about the 
second, more fine-grained sub-goal (i.e., to realize contacting the lamp ‘by using the head’). 
The present experiments tested predictions derived from this proposal. In Experiment 
1, we investigated whether social-communicative signals are necessary to elicit the re-
enactment of a teleologically unjustified action. If the account described above is correct, 
observation of a non-communicative action should not induce the presumption of relevance 
and the acquisition of arbitrary means actions. Experiment 2 tested whether information about 
the overall goal-state (i.e., the function of the novel artifact) is necessary to be present in the 
demonstration, as our proposal hypothesized, and whether the function of the learning is 
primarily epistemic or social. 
Experiment 1
While various alternative theories have been advanced to account for the underlying 
mechanisms driving imitative learning, apart from the current approach none of them 
proposed that the communicative context of action demonstration plays a qualitative role in 
inducing selective imitation of novel means in different action contexts. One alternative 
account proposes that infants' observation of an action with a salient effect makes them 
interpret it as a goal-directed action, and infants are motivated to imitate goals (Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005). Another approach 
suggests that imitation occurs as a consequence of motor resonance of previously encoded 
action-effect associations that are activated by the observed actions (Paulus et al., 2011a, 
2011b). Yet another alternative proposes that action imitation is modulated by the differential 
amount of attention evoked by the variable saliency of the target action performed in different 
contexts (Beisert et al., 2012). None of these alternatives predict, however, a differential 
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pattern of action imitation as a function of whether the target action is communicatively 
demonstrated to the infant or is simply observed from a 3rd-person perspective without 
communication. In contrast, if re-enactment depends on the interpretation of the observed 
action, which, in turn, is modulated by ostensive-communicative signals (Southgate, 
Chevallier, & Csibra, 2009), selective imitation is expected only in communicative contexts. 
Experiment 1 contrasted these alternative hypotheses by repeating the Gergely et al. (2002) 
study both in a communicative context (as in the original version) and in a non-
communicative 3rd-person observation situation.
Method
Design. We investigated the effect of two independent variables on infants’ tendency 
to imitate. The first independent variable was whether the model’s action was observed when 
presented communicatively to the infant (Communicative Context) or from a 3rd-person 
observational perspective when it was intentionally performed in a non-communicative 
context (Incidental Observation Context). The second independent variable was the mode of 
presentation of the target action (Hands Free vs. Hands Occupied), as in Gergely et al. (2002). 
These two factors were crossed in a factorial design, creating four groups of participants.
Participants. Seventy-five 14-month-old infants were recruited through 
advertisements in local newspapers. Six of them were excluded from the final sample because 
of technical error (n = 2), parental interference (n = 1), or fussiness (n = 3). The remaining 69 
children were randomly assigned into one of the four conditions. Mean age, sex distribution, 
and number of infants in each condition are presented in Table 1.
Apparatus. The tool on which the target action was modeled for the infants was a 
small, circular, translucent 'magic lamp', mounted on a box (sized 27 x 19 x 4.5 cm). The 
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lamp reacted to a gentle push by lighting up and remained illuminated until it was released. 
The lamp was placed on a small table in between the model and the infant during the 
modeling phase, and was presented to the infants at the same location during the test phase. 
The sessions were monitored and videotaped from behind a one-way mirror.
Procedure. The procedure was composed of a modeling phase and a test phase.
Modeling phase: Communicative context. The infants were seated on their parent’s 
lap in front of the table with the magic lamp, covered with a cloth. The distance from the table 
was about one meter, which prevented them from reaching the apparatus. Mothers were 
instructed not to interact with their baby during the modeling phase. The experimenter sat 
down at the other side of the table, uncovered the magic lamp, looked at the infant, called his/
her name, making sure that the infant paid attention. Then she shuddered, and told another 
experimenter who was present in the laboratory that she was cold and asked for a blanket. 
After the blanket was handed to her, she wrapped it around her shoulders. In the Hands Free 
condition, she left the blanket hanging on her shoulders. She then placed her visibly free 
hands on the table, on either side of the magic lamp. In the Hands Occupied condition, she 
wrapped the blanket around her shoulders and held it tightly with both hands. In both 
conditions, the model then bent forward from waist and lit up the lamp by touching it with her 
forehead. She repeated this action three times, making eye contact with the infant in between 
these actions and calling the infant's attention if necessary.
Modeling phase: Incidental Observation context. In this context, the experimenter 
did not interact with the infant. The child and the parent were seated in a restricted playing 
area of the laboratory by experimenter A, and the parent was instructed to play with the child. 
The restricted playing area was a blanket laid on the floor, and parents were asked to keep 
their infants there. From this playing zone the children could clearly see the table where the 
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modeling would take place, which was about 2 meters away. After a short delay, 
Experimenter B (the model) entered the room, and went straight to the table without looking 
at or speaking to the infant. She uncovered the magic lamp and rang a buzzer to call the 
infant’s attention. Mothers were asked not to look at the model except when infants were 
pointing to her. When the infant paid attention to the model, a confederate from behind a one-
way mirror indicated to the model that she could perform the target action by switching on a 
hidden LED. Experimenter B then wrapped the blanket around her shoulders, leaving her 
hands free or occupied (depending on the condition), and then modeled the target action three 
times. The hidden LED alerted the model whether the infant was watching her without having 
to look at the child. If needed, the model operated the buzzer again to get the infant's 
attention. After performing the target action three times, the model covered the magic lamp 
and left the room without looking at the infant.
Test phase. The test phase followed the modeling phase by 10 minutes, which the 
child spent outside the laboratory. In the Communicative context, the model led the child and 
the parent to the apparatus, encouraged the infant to play with it, and stayed in the room. In 
the Incidental Observation situation, Experimenter A (not the model) seated the participant 
next to the apparatus, encouraged the infant to play with it, and then left the room.
Data analysis and scoring. The video records of the test phase were scored by two 
independent observers who were uninformed as to which of the conditions the participant 
belonged to. The dependent measure was whether the infant attempted to perform the head-
on-box action within a 20 s time window. An attempt was defined as either touching the lamp 
with the head, or leaning forward in such a way that the infant’s head approached the lamp 
within 10 cm or less (see Meltzoff, 1988). The two coders' evaluation of the participants' 
performance was in 100 % agreement.
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Results
The overall time spent with looking at the demonstration was measured to check 
whether infants attended to the demonstrator during the modeling phase equally in each 
condition. The mean looking times are presented in Table 1. An analysis of variance found no 
significant difference among the four conditions in the time spent looking at the demonstrator 
(F(3, 65) = 2. 476,  p = .069).
The number of infants imitating the target action is presented in Table 1. An overall 
analysis of the proportion of imitators was performed by a Generalized Linear Model (a 
general logistic model for binary variables) along 2 (presentation condition: Hands Occupied, 
Hands Free) x 2 (context : Communicative vs. Incidental Observation) factors. This analysis 
yielded no main effect of presentation condition (Hands Occupied, Hands Free) (Wald χ2 = 
1.354, df = 1, n.s.), and there was no effect of context (Communicative vs. Incidental 
Observation) either (Wald χ2 = 4.564, df = 1, n.s.). However, the interaction of the above 
factors (presentation condition * context) was significant (Wald χ2 = 6.326, df = 1, p = .012). 
To explore this interaction, we performed separate Fisher exact tests in the two 
contexts. In the Communicative Context, modeling the action in the Hands Free condition 
produced more imitation than in the Hands Occupied condition (Fisher exact p = .018). No 
such effect was found in the Incidental Observation context (Fisher exact p = .489).
Additionally, we performed a follow up analysis to check whether the reproduction of 
the novel head-touch action occurred as a result of more attention to the demonstration.  We 
compared the overall looking time at the model during the modeling phase between infants 
who were ’imitators‘ or ’non-imitators’ in the test phase. We found that there was no 
significant difference between the looking times of these groups (‘imitators: M = 34.42 s, SD 
BEYOND RATIONAL IMITATION     15
= 4.91 s; non-imitators: M = 34.12 s, SD = 5.60 s; t(66) = 0.219, p = .827). A closer look at 
the sequence of actions performed by the infants revealed that, without exception, all of them 
used their hands first to attain the final goal of lighting up the lamp. This was true for both the 
Communicative and the Incidental Observation contexts, and for both the Hands Free and 
Hands Occupied demonstration conditions.
Since the variability of the particular manner of re-enactment of the head touch actions 
reflects the degree of fidelity of imitative motor responses,  and can hence be indicative of the 
underlying mechanism that mediates social learning, the specific forms of head touches were 
also coded in this sample. Interestingly, 10 infants (36%) out of 28 imitators performed two or 
even three different forms of head actions during the testing session. Only three infants (11%) 
produced a faithful motor copy of touching the lamp with the forehead, though two of them 
also used other parts of their head to light up the lamp (contacting it with an ear or with the 
face). Looking at the first instances of head touches only, there were only three high-fidelity 
imitative responses (touches with the forehead); 10 touches with the mouth (four of them 
followed by other forms of head touches); four touches with the nose; three contacts with one 
of the cheeks, and in 8 cases the head only approached the lamp-box within 10 cm (without 
contacting it). This variability of the head contact actions revealed that the re-enactment of 
head touches showed low fidelity when compared to the model’s demonstrated forehead 
action.
We also tested the empirical validity of the assumption that the head-touch action is a 
‘sub-optimal’ means for the infants to bring about the final goal. We counted the number of 
head-touches that were successful in lighting up the lamp (see Table 1.): overall, 67,8 % of 
infants who re-enacted the target act managed to attain the goal by this means, while goal 
attainment through the hand actions was always successful (100 %). This clearly indicates 
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that the novel head touch was a more awkward and less efficient means action for the infants 
to perform than to touch the lamp by the familiar hand action. 
Discussion
Our results in the Communicative context replicated the original findings of Gergely et 
al. (2002), and thus strengthen the interpretation that infants can adapt their re-enactment 
behavior to the justifiability of the goal-directed actions performed by a model (see also 
Schwier et al, 2006; Buttelmann et al, 2008; Király, 2009a; Zmyj et al, 2009). Importantly, 
infants in the Hands Occupied condition did not re-enact the observed means action. Rather, 
they achieved the same final goal by the most efficient action available to them, i.e., by their 
hands.
Our findings also show that ‘selective imitation’ of the head action, and thus the re-
enactment of a cognitively opaque and arbitrary means, appeared only in the Communicative 
context. Infants in the Incidental Observation condition did not perform more head-touch in 
the Hands Free than in the Hands Occupied condition. Our procedure assured that they had 
equal visual access to the head-touch actions as did infants in the Communicative context, and 
our measure of their looking time at the demonstrator’s actions confirmed that they attended 
to the target actions equally in both conditions. The results demonstrate that infants learned 
about the affordance properties of the novel object in both conditions (as shown by their equal 
success in illuminating the lamp). However, there is no evidence to suggest that in the 
Incidental Observation condition infants also acquired the obviously arbitrary head touch 
means action that the model chose to operate the lamp. 
Furthermore, infants' selective low-fidelity re-enactment seems to reflect a 
hierarchically organized goal-emulative strategy. In fact, the results suggest that infants 
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inferred that the relevant information that the model's communicative demonstration intended 
to manifest for them in the Hands Free condition consisted of two goals that are hierarchically  
organized. The final goal is to bring about an interesting effect (illuminate the box by 
exploiting its affordance properties), and the relevant sub-goal is the means by which the 
effect should be brought about (contact the box with the head). The differential pattern of 
reenactment of the exact same motor behavior observed in the Communicative versus 
Incidental Observation context thus raises doubts about the resonance-based automatic motor 
copying account of imitative learning (Paulus et al., 2011a). These findings also seem hard to 
account for in terms of the assumed differential salience of the head action in the Hands Free 
versus Hands Occupied contexts (Beisert et al., 2012) as the very same action contexts were 
tested both in the Communicative and the Incidental Observation conditions.
Note also that even in the condition in which the head-action was reliably reproduced, 
infants' re-enactments remained relatively low-fidelity. The model demonstrated touching the 
lamp with her forehead, which infants reproduced by contacting the lamp with virtually any 
part of their head. This suggests that infants encoded the intended sub-goal at a relatively 
abstract level (‘establish contact between lamp and head’) and emulated that sub-goal non-
imitatively by producing a variety of alternative head-actions (Csibra, 2007). This variability 
of low-fidelity renditions of the demonstrated head touch action is also hard to account for in 
terms of the direct matching induced motor resonance approach to imitation (Paulus et al., 
2011a).
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the proposal that infants learn the 
head-touch action as a means to achieve the final goal, but they do not constitute a proof of 
BEYOND RATIONAL IMITATION     18
this assumption. Our proposal is that infants use the interpretative scheme of the teleological 
stance (Gergely & Csibra, 2003) to infer the related elements of an ongoing action sequence 
and organize them around the attainable goal state. To test this hypothesis, in Experiment 2 
we violated the availability of a well-formed goal-state information in the modeling situation 
by presenting the head action so that it did not induce a perceivable effect. If the minimal 
interpretability of an overall goal serves as an anchor for learning (and potentially for 
generalization), and for hierarchically relating a sub-goal to it, infants should not be able to 
interpret the behavior as an instrumental action without supporting information about it’s goal 
and no acquisition of the novel behavior is expected.
Another question concerns the motivation behind infants' acquisition of arbitrary 
means actions. In Experiment 1, we co-varied the presence or absence of communicative 
signals in the modeling phase with the presence or absence of the experimenter in the test 
phase. It is thus possible that the differential tendency to reproduce the novel means action in 
the two contexts was attributable to the presence of the model during test rather that to her 
communication signals during demonstration. Indeed, it has been proposed that imitation 
serves a social function by letting infants express their affiliation to others (Nielsen & Blank, 
2011; Over & Carpenter, 2012). If this is the case, infants may re-enact the newly acquired 
means action not because they have learnt a novel behavior with instrumental value but in 
order to demonstrate to the model that they have acquired it. We attempted to address this 
issue by varying the experimental setup of the test phase as follows. In one condition, the 
model who had demonstrated the target behavior was present during testing, in the other 
condition no model or communicative partner was present during testing, only the infant‘s 
parent. Crucially, the novel action was demonstrated in an ostensive manner in both 
conditions. 
BEYOND RATIONAL IMITATION     19
Method
 Design. There were three experimental conditions: Model Present, Model Absent, and 
No Effect. In all three conditions the head action was demonstrated to infants in the Hands 
Free version and in a communicative manner. 
Participants. Fifty 14-month-old infants were recruited through advertisements in 
local newspapers. Five of them were excluded from the final sample because of technical 
error (n = 1), parental interference (n = 1), or failure to come back for the test phase of the 
study (n = 3). The remaining 45 children were assigned into one of the three conditions. Mean 
age, sex distribution, and number of infants in each condition are presented in Table 1.
Apparatus. The same apparatus was used as in Experiment 1
Procedure. In the Model Present and Model Absent conditions, infants were brought 
to the laboratory twice, with a one-week delay in between. The first session consisted of the 
modeling phase, the second session (a week later) was the test phase of the study. In the No 
Effect condition a short (10 minutes) delay was used, as in Experiment 1.
Our rationale to introduce these different delay intervals was motivated by several 
considerations. First, we wanted to present empirical proof for the claim that the same effect 
of selective learning that has been demonstrated following a shorter (10 minutes) delay can be 
similarly induced after a long (one week) delay as well. Second, a central purpose of 
Experiment 2 was to disentangle whether it is the epistemic function or the social-affiliative 
function of imitation that is the dominant determinant of infants’ performance in this 
particular task. To compare the relative contribution of the epistemic motive (as tested by the 
Model Absent condition) versus the social-affiliative motive (and/or the effect on recall of the 
presence of the demonstrator as an additional mnemonic cue, tested by the Model Present 
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condition) we used the same delay interval in both conditions. Note that if imitation serves 
primarily the epistemic function of learning using the longer (one week) delay would not be 
expected to influence the pattern of action re-enactment, while assuming the primacy of the 
social-affiliative function infants’ imitative performance would be more likely to be reduced 
after a long delay due to the possible decrease in salience of the memory of the experimenter 
with whom the infant was interacting during the demonstration phase. For this reason, we 
chose to use the longer (one week) delay to compare the Model Present versus Model Absent 
conditions. 
On the other hand, the No Effect condition was designed with the primary purpose to 
test whether the selective re-enactment of the head action induced in the communicative 
demonstration condition of Experiment 1 was constrained by the interpretability of the head 
touch as a goal-directed instrumental action or whether it was solely determined by the 
facilitative influence of the ostensive demonstration context to induce imitative behavior. This 
required that we test for the relative degree of imitation of the two types of actions by using 
the same delay interval in the No Effect condition as the one we used for testing the imitation 
of the head action with an observable effect in Experiment 1: so we employed the same (10 
minutes) delay in the No Effect condition of Experiment 2 as well. 
Modeling phase: Model Present and Model Absent. This phase was identical to the 
modeling phase of the Hands Free condition in the Communicative context of Experiment 1.
Modeling phase: No Effect condition. The demonstration was identical to the Hands 
Free condition in the Communicative context of Experiment 1 with the exception that, when 
the model bent forward, she stopped short of touching the lamp by about 2 cm, and did not 
light it up. This action was repeated three times and was accompanied by the usual 
communicative signals.
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Test phase: Model Present condition. Infants again were seated on their parents lap in 
front of the table with the uncovered magic lamp, but this time at a distance that allowed them 
to reach it. The model who had demonstrated the head-touch action a week earlier sat on the 
other side and encouraged the infant to play with the apparatus, without giving explicit 
instructions.
Test phase: Model Absent condition. Infants had the opportunity to play with the 
props in the presence of their parent only. Mothers were asked to refrain from giving any 
direct instruction with respect to the modeling phase.
Test phase: No Effect condition. The model who demonstrated the head-touch action 
ten minutes earlier sat on the other side of the table and encouraged the infant to play with the 
apparatus, without giving explicit instruction.
Data analysis and scoring. The same procedure was used to analyze the recording as 
in Experiment 1. Only two infants' performance was evaluated differently by the coders, and 
these cases were resolved by repeated scoring until agreement was reached.
Results 
The overall time spent with looking at the demonstration by infants is presented in 
Table 1. An analysis of variance revealed that there was no significant difference among the 
three conditions in this measure (F(2,42) = 1.726, p = .190).
Number and proportion of infants who performed the target action are presented in 
Table 1. We compared the performance in the three conditions to each other in a χ2 test, and 
found that they were significantly different from each other (χ2(2) = 11.396, df = 2,  p = .003). 
We also compared the performance in the three conditions pair-wise: the frequency of target 
actions did not differ significantly between the Model Present and Model Absent conditions 
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(Fisher exact p = .462); while the frequency of target action was lower in the No Effect 
condition than it was in the Model Present and Model Absent conditions (Fisher exact p = .
001, and p = .019, respectively).
We also compared children's performance in the No Effect condition to the Hands Free 
condition presented in Communicative context (Experiment 1) to check the potential impact 
of difference in delay on imitative tendencies. Here again, the frequency of target action was 
lower in the No Effect condition than in the Hands Free condition presented in 
Communicative context (Fisher exact p = .002).
To directly test whether changing the delay from 10 minutes to one week had any 
effect on imitative re-enactment tendencies, we also compared children's performance in the 
Model Present condition of Experiment 2 to the Communicative context - Hands Free 
condition of Experiment 1. There was no significant difference between the re-enactment of 
target behavior in the above conditions (Fisher exact p = 1.000) suggesting that learning of the 
opaque head action was not influenced by the different length of delays in the two 
experiments. 
Discussion
Our findings suggest that while ostensive-communicative signals are important, by 
themselves they are not sufficient to trigger action imitation. When the communicatively 
demonstrated head action was observed without a consequent visible effect being brought 
about infants ceased to re-enact the model’s head action. This is consistent with the proposal 
that infants attempt to organize their interpretation of the demonstrated behavior into a 
hierarchical teleological structure of an instrumental goal-directed action that is anchored by 
the artifact function. This result is in line with the empirical findings of Paulus et al. (2011b), 
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who found that the modeled action must be followed by a salient action effect in order to be 
imitated. Paulus et al. argue that the activation of the infants’ own motor response can only be 
linked to the representation of the action effect if the latter is salient, and when this happens, 
an association is automatically established between the activated motor program and the 
object producing the salient effect. However, the results of Experiment 1 are incompatible 
with this account because they provide no evidence that such an automatic association has 
been formed in the Incidental Observation condition. We think that the role of the action 
effect is more likely to be that of specifying the relevant information about the function of the 
artifact (the final goal that can be achieved with it), which can provide an anchor that the 
further elements of the communicatively demonstrated action can be related to as sub-goals. 
Our findings are in accordance with the results of Lyons et al. (2007, Experiment 2B) 
who found that four-year-old children do not overimitate demonstrated actions in which the 
contact principle was violated. The authors interpreted this finding as supporting their 
hypothesis that core assumptions of naïve physics need to be satisfied to bring into play an 
automatic causal interpretation of the behavior as an instrumental act for the sake of learning 
(Lyons et al, 2007).
Furthermore, we found that infants tend to use a novel means-action as a sub-goal to 
attain a final goal both when the model who had demonstrated the behavior to them was 
present or when she was absent during the re-enactment phase. This finding lends support to 
the claim that, though it is crucial for infants to receive the novel information to be learned 
from a communicative partner, the subsequent re-enactment of the acquired means action can 
be elicited without social cueing. This supports the view that the acquisition of the novel 
action was driven by an epistemic motive: the equal likelihood of it’s re-enactment even in the 
absence of a social partner reflects the fact that the action has been learnt as a culturally 
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relevant novel instrumental means that ought to be used to operate the novel artifact. This 
result also confirms that the absence of head-touch reproduction in the Incidental Observation 
context of Experiment 1 was not due to the absence of the model during the test phase.
At the same time, finding no significant difference between the proportion of re-
enactment of the novel means act in the Model Present vs. Model Absent testing conditions 
seems at first sight unexpected given the results of Király (2009a) who, using a different task, 
found that when tested in the presence of the model infants were more likely to attempt to re-
enact a previously demonstrated rather complex tool-use procedure to attain a goal (93% 
attempted tool use) than when they were tested without the demonstrator’s presence (65% 
attempted tool use). This discrepancy, however, is plausibly attributable to factors stemming 
from the significantly higher difficulty for infants to perform the complex tool-use action 
demonstrated in the Király (2009a) study (practically none of the imitators succeeded in 
achieving the goal by their attempted reproduction of the novel tool-use) than to perform the 
head touch action in the current paradigm (67.8 % of ‘imitators’ were successful in lighting up 
the lamp through reproducing the novel head touch action).  In our view, the increased 
proportion of imitative attempts to re-enact the novel too-use in the presence of the 
demonstrator can also be plausibly attributed to infants epistemic motive to learn relevant and 
new information from the communicative demonstrator. 
Recently, Nielsen and Blank (2011) reported a study where children showed an 
increased likelihood of imitating previously observed opaque and arbitrary parts of an action 
sequence to achieve a goal when tested in their demonstrator’s presence as compared to the 
presence of another  model who had demonstrated to them a more efficient – and simpler – 
version of the goal-approach that did not include the  unnecessary target actions in question. 
The four-year-old subjects of this study produced irrelevant actions at a significantly lower 
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rate when given the apparatus by the efficient adult demonstrator than when the apparatus 
was handed over to them by the adult who had demonstrated the irrelevant actions to them in 
the first place. We accept the interpretation of Nielsen and Blank (2011) that this finding 
demonstrates that social affiliative motives can indeed influence and increase imitation of 
others, at least, in four-year-olds. However, it should be noted that the results also provide 
positive evidence for the influence of the epistemic motive underlying children’s imitation of 
the demonstrated opaque means actions: after all, they did re-enact the demonstrated 
irrelevant actions even when interacting with the efficient demonstrator though they 
admittedly (and quite understandably) did so with lower frequency than when tested by the 
inefficient model. 
These findings - together with the present results - suggest therefore that, although the 
presence of a social model can in some circumstances increase the rate of imitation, it is not a 
necessary condition for the learning and imitative re-enactment of novel means actions from 
communicative demonstrations by others.
General Discussion
We have offered a re-interpretation of the phenomenon known as 'rational imitation' in 
the literature, and tested predictions drawn from this interpretation in two experiments. Under 
our proposal, the mechanism behind this phenomenon is not 'imitation' (in the sense of motor 
copying actions), nor does it reflect the application of the principle of rationality (in the sense 
of optimal instrumental action selection). Rather, our account explains this phenomenon as an 
interplay between (1) specific forms of human communication, (2) the learning of hierarchical 
teleological structures of artifact function and use, and (3) emulative manifestation of 
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acquired knowledge. The results of the studies presented in this paper confirmed the 
predictions drawn from this account.
Ostensive communication has been proposed to induce expectation of the opportunity 
to acquire new and relevant knowledge from the source of communication in human children 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2009). We think that many earlier studies that have ostensibly investigated 
the mechanisms of imitation have actually studied how children interpret communicative 
action demonstrations. So far, not many experiments have contrasted communicative vs. non-
communicative demonstrations, but the ones that have done so have found different patterns 
of imitation in these conditions (Nielsen, 2006; Brugger et al., 2007; Southgate et al., 2009). 
Our results confirm these findings. However, unlike Nielsen (2006) and Brugger et al. (2007), 
who emphasize the role of the 'social' nature of demonstrations in general, the proposal we 
defend points to the role of child-directed communication as the crucial factor influencing re-
enactment and learning of novel skills and means actions demonstrated. Since human social 
interaction is normally communicative in nature, these two kinds of account predict action 
reproduction in similar situations. However, the absence of re-enactment in the absence of 
obvious artefact function, and the undiminished tendency to reproduce a novel means action 
in the absence of a social partner in Experiment 2, are more consistent with the primarily 
epistemic than social function of observational action learning.
Our results also speak against proposals a) that consider only the motor aspects of 
action demonstrations in explaining imitative behaviors (Paulus et al., 2011a, 2011b), and b) 
that try to interpret the findings of the original head-touch study in terms of varying 
attentional distractiveness of the different mode of presentations (Beisert et al., 2012), since 
both the motor components and the relative salience and distractiveness of the demonstrations 
were similar across contexts and conditions in Experiment 1.
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We have proposed that when children observe an object-directed instrumental action 
in the context of ostensive communication, they interpret the action in a different manner. If 
the manifested new behavior is a goal-directed action resulting in a well-defined outcome 
state (effecting a change of state in the world), infants try to interpret it in terms of their 
teleological representational schema, but they 'suspend' the rationality requirement that the 
action has to be the most efficient means available in the situation (cf. Gergely and Jacob, 
2012). They do so because they expect relevant information (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), and 
one way that the content of the communication could be relevant for them is if it reveals 
arbitrary means-end relations about the novel artifact that the infants could not have 
discovered on their own (lacking relevant causal knowledge). Thus, when children observe, in 
a communicative context, a goal-directed action that cannot be justified by invoking the 
principle of rationality, they interpret it as an arbitrary sub-goal to be fulfilled in the service of 
attaining the final goal. Indeed, when children have already acquired means-end knowledge 
about an artifact (which is therefore no longer novel), they do not learn a non-efficient means 
action performed on it, even in an ostensive communicative context (Pinkham & Jaswal, 
2011). Similarly, they do not learn such an action when it is not addressed to them (i.e., in an 
Incidental Observation context), because this action does not carry much expected relevance 
for them.
It is important to emphasize that communication does not make infants learn just any 
arbitrary action. As Experiment 2 demonstrated, children must be able to assign to the action a 
well-formed teleological interpretation (Gergely & Csibra, 2003) in order to acquire it. 
Although the action may be arbitrary, it is not an arbitrary goal in itself, but an arbitrary 
means towards some final goal. If some observations (e.g., turning on a light by a head action 
when hands are available) do not fit in this model, the explanatory attempt fails. However, the 
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ostensive communicative context induces a search for a finer-grained action explanation that 
extends the hierarchical representation of the teleological schema by sanctioning the inclusion 
of a more specific sub-goal.2
Finally, when infants are given the opportunity to handle the novel artifact, they 
retrieve this hierarchical representation and perform actions that reproduce the goals and sub-
goals stored in their memory. Such a process is essentially a kind of emulation, driven by the 
motivation to achieve and learn (sub-)goals rather than to re-enact actions (cf., Csibra, 2007; 
and the notion of 'goal-directed imitation’, Bekkering et al., 2000; Carpenter et al, 2005). This 
is consistent with the claim that in other contexts, imitative action reproduction may serve 
social functions (Over & Carpenter, 2012), and it is also possible that the primacy of social-
affiliative function of imitation emerges later in development (see Nielsen & Blank, 2011).
We are aware of the potential limitations of the fact that our theoretical proposals are 
based on studies with infants of a limited age range and from the detailed examination of the 
conditions inducing selective imitation, which, however, relies predominantly on using one 
specific task only - the head touch paradigm. Though this fact represents a challenge for the 
generalizability of our findings, there is increasing amount of new evidence indicating that the 
phenomena we have uncovered can be successfully demonstrated and further investigated by 
using a variety of other tasks as well (see Brugger et al, 2007; Schwier et al. 2006; and 
Southgate et al., 2009). As an example, Nielsen (2006) found that 12-month-olds copied a 
specific novel tool use when it’s relevance for goal attainment was made explicit to them by 
providing negative evidence about the applicability of the alternative prepotent action 
available in their motor repertoire. However, when no such additional evidence was made 
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2 For a recent logical formalization of the action interpretation mechanism that children 
employ, see Varga & van Lambalgen’s (2011) model which conceptualizes this system as a 
'closed-world' reasoning process that involves both action interpretation and action planning. 
accessible to them and the tool-use was demonstrated in isolation, they did not learn and 
imitate the novel means action. Such results underline the need for further research to explore 
and understand better the effects of demonstrating different types of target actions and their 
informative contribution in modulating infants’ re-enactment tendencies in different contexts. 
Furthermore, some recent imitation studies with two- and three-year-old children now clearly 
indicate that selective imitation is not an isolated and transient developmental phenomenon 
that is restricted only to an early phase of infant cognitive development and social learning 
(e.g., Williamson, Meltzoff & Markman, 2008; Király, 2009b). Such results make us 
confident that future research using a larger variety of task domains as well as a wider range 
of age groups will lead us to a fuller understanding and appreciation of the central role that 
ostensive communication and demonstrative manifestations play in making the efficient 
cultural transmission and stabilization of relevant and shared, even if cognitively opaque 
cultural knowledge possible in human social groups. 
Indeed, our re-interpretation of action reproduction in communicative contexts 
explains a host of findings in the literature, but raises a question about the ultimate purpose of 
this learning process. Why do infants and children learn non-efficient instrumental actions 
from communicative demonstrations, when they could discover such actions themselves, and 
may even find more efficient means to the same goals (Pinkham & Jaswal, 2011)? We think 
that the answer to this question lies in the inherent opacity of culturally accumulated means-
end knowledge, which is often embodied in human artifacts (Gergely & Csibra, 2006). Such 
knowledge is difficult to acquire by individual learning or by observational social learning, 
but benevolent adults could facilitate such learning by communicatively demonstrating it to 
the child.
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Together with other findings, our results show that infants do expect to learn from 
child-directed communication. If they do so, they are 'rational' in the evolutionary sense: they 
learn more efficiently than they would without relying on adults' communication. 
Nevertheless, as the current results attest the mechanisms of such learning cannot be 
explained solely by reliance on the principle of rationality of instrumental actions alone (cf. 
Gergely & Jacob, 2012).
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Table 1









Looking Time to 
the Model (s) [SD]
Infants Performing 






Hands Free 17 60.94 7/10 32.0 [4.9] 11(8) 64.7
Hands Occupied 17 61.02 8/9 36.3 [5.5] 4(3) 23.5
Incidental
Hands Free 17 60.53 5/12 35.6 [4.9] 5 (3) 29.4
Hands Occupied 18 61.20 8/10 33.2 [4.5] 8(5) 44.4
Experiment 2
No Effect 14 61.41 8/8 31.0 [4.6] 1(0) 7.1
Model Present 13 61.20 7/6 34.6 [5.4] 9(5) 69.2
   Model Absent 18 60.07 9/9 33.5 [5.5] 9(6) 50.0
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